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Has Globalization Increased 
the Synchronicity of  
International Business Cycles?
By Travis J. Berge
From the business cycle peak at the end of 2007 to the trough in mid-2009, the U.S. economy shrank by 5 percent and lost nearly 9 million jobs, making the 2007-09 recession the most 
severe downturn of the post-World War II era. However, the United 
States was not alone; the downturn was global. Global output fell 
more than 5 percent during this period and most advanced economies 
simultaneously experienced a recession. Viewed from this perspective, 
the startling feature of the recent recession was not only its depth but 
its breadth—no event since the Great Depression has produced such 
wide-ranging consequences. 
While the financial crisis in the United States in part sparked the 
global downturn, it is the slowdown in Europe that threatens the U.S. 
economy today. In his June 2012 testimony to Congress, Federal Re-
serve Chairman Ben Bernanke said, “The crisis in Europe has affected 
the U.S. economy by acting as a drag on our exports, weighing on busi-
ness and consumer confidence and pressuring U.S. financial markets 
and institutions.” Going further, Bernanke noted, “…the situation in 
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Europe poses significant risks to the U.S. financial system and econo-
my and must be monitored closely.” 
The global recession and continuing tremors in advanced econo-
mies suggest that the degree of synchronization among business cycles 
internationally has increased significantly. Lurking in the background 
of the increase in synchronization is the dramatic increase over the past 
30 years in the volume of trade in goods and international financial 
holdings. The number of bilateral and regional free trade agreements 
has increased steadily over this period and the volume of trade in goods 
has followed suit. Financial connections have increased as countries 
liberalize financial markets. 
This article shows that business cycles have become more synchro-
nized over the past 20 years. After identifying the dates of expansions 
and recessions for a group of 32 industrialized countries since 1960, 
Section I shows that business cycles have become more synchronized 
over the past 20 years. Section II describes how increased global trade 
in goods and financial products have contributed to the increase in 
business cycle synchronicity. It then shows that there is little evidence 
that financial linkages have affected the synchronization of business 
cycles internationally. However, trade does affect the synchronization 
of business cycles. Countries with high trade volume have more syn-
chronized business cycles. 
I.  THE SYNCHRONICITY OF INTERNATIONAL  
BUSINESS CYCLES
Determining what impact, if any, globalization has had on the syn-
chronization of business cycles internationally requires clear definitions 
of business cycles and synchronization. This section estimates the dates 
of recessions and expansions for 32 countries. Countries were included 
based on their size and the availability of data. Table A1 of Appendix I 
provides the details. With the 32 countries in the sample representing 
nearly 70 percent of global output, this section also documents basic 
facts about international business cycles and creates a global recession 
index that measures the global business cycle since 1960. The index 
highlights the severity of the most recent downturn. Finally, the sec-
tion measures business cycle synchronicity between each country-pair 
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in the sample. Since around 1990, business cycles have become much 
more synchronized internationally. 
Dating international business cycles 
Economic activity tends to follow a cyclical pattern. Activity in-
creases during an expansion until it reaches a peak, then declines during 
a recession until it reaches a trough. The cycle is then repeated. A com-
mon definition of recession is two consecutive quarters of declining real 
GDP. However, the Business Cycle Dating Committee of the National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), the arbiter of U.S. business 
cycle peaks and troughs, takes a broader view: “A recession is a sig-
nificant decline in economic activity spread across the economy, lasting 
more than a few months, normally visible in production, employment, 
real income, and other indicators” (NBER 2008). When the NBER 
announced the trough date for the most recent recession, it made clear 
that the decision rested on identifying the trough date for many differ-
ent economic indicators, not just GDP.1 
Following the NBER, this article uses a broad range of indicators to 
determine whether an economy is in recession or expansion. The indi-
cators are real GDP, unemployment, industrial production and a retail 
sales index. Peaks and troughs are identified for each variable separately. 
Peaks are defined as quarters in which the variable is greater than in 
the two preceding quarters and the two following quarters. Similarly, 
troughs are quarters in which the variable is less than in the two preced-
ing quarters and the two following quarters. Identifying turning points 
in this way is known as the Bry-Boschan algorithm (Bry and Boschan 
1972; Harding and Pagan 2002). 
The results of applying the Bry-Boschan algorithm to U.S. GDP 
are shown in Chart 1. The chart shows U.S. real GDP since 1960 with 
business cycle peaks in blue and troughs in gray. The algorithm iden-
tifies the majority of NBER-defined U.S. recessions since 1960. The 
only exception is the 2001 recession, during which GDP did not fall 
for two consecutive quarters. This omission highlights the need to look 
across many different indicators when dating business cycles. Although 
the Bry-Boschan algorithm applied to GDP data misses the 2001 reces-
sion, each of the other three indicators does show a peak-trough pattern 
around the 2001 recession. 
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Applying the Bry-Boschan algorithm to each of the four indicators 
produces separate recession chronologies. These chronologies are com-
bined using a “wiring ratio” that calculates the fraction of pairs of chro-
nologies that indicate a recession.2 The wiring ratio for the four indica-
tors describing the U.S. economy is shown in the lower panel of Chart 
1, where NBER-defined recessions are shaded in gray. The wiring ratio 
effectively replicates the NBER dates. The methodology produces one 
short-lived false positive recession in the fourth quarter of 1966 and 
the first quarter of 1967 that is not identified by the NBER. Otherwise 
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CALCULATING PEAKS AND TROUGHS IN U.S. REAL GDP 
AND OVERALL U.S. ECONOMIC ACTIVITY USING THE 
BRY-BOSCHAN ALGORITHM
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SUMMARY STATISTICS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
CYCLE CHRONOLOGIES
Source: Author calculations.
Number of
observations
Number of quarters
in recession
Percentage of
time in recession
Number of
recessions
Average duration (quarters)
Country Recession Expansion
Argentina 89 23 26% 5 4.6 11.0
Australia 208 44 21% 11 4.0 13.7
Austria 208 53 25% 14 3.8 11.1
Belgium 208 47 23% 10 4.7 16.1
Brazil 148 37 25% 12 3.1 9.3
Canada 208 22 11% 4 5.5 37.2
Chile 208 66 32% 12 5.5 11.8
Czech Re-
public
88 25 28% 5 5.0 10.5
Denmark 208 53 25% 12 4.4 12.9
Finland 208 40 19% 7 5.7 21.0
France 208 50 24% 8 6.3 17.6
Greece 200 52 26% 8 6.5 18.5
Germany 208 54 26% 10 5.4 14.0
Great Britain 208 41 20% 7 5.9 20.9
Iceland 128 40 31% 5 8.0 14.7
Ireland 208 39 19% 9 4.3 16.9
Israel 208 29 14% 6 4.8 25.6
Italy 208 54 26% 12 4.5 12.8
Japan 208 43 21% 9 4.8 16.5
Mexico 208 44 21% 10 4.4 14.9
Netherlands 208 32 15% 7 4.6 29.3
Norway 208 53 25% 7 7.6 22.1
New Zealand 196 59 30% 12 4.9 10.5
Portugal 208 39 19% 8 4.9 21.1
Russia 77 8 10% 2 4.0 23.0
South Africa 208 50 24% 9 5.6 15.8
South Korea 208 11 5% 3 3.7 49.3
Spain 204 27 13% 5 5.4 35.4
Sweden 208 40 19% 7 5.7 21.0
Switzerland 208 78 38% 11 7.1 11.8
Turkey 128 25 20% 7 3.6 12.9
United States 208 34 16% 8 4.3 19.3
Average 189 41 22% 8 5.1 18.7
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the algorithm matches the NBER dates very well, picking up the 2001 
recession that was missed by the measure that focused only on GDP. 
Using the wiring ratio, a single recession chronology for each 
country can be calculated. A threshold value of 0.15 is used to identify 
whether an economy is in recession; this threshold means that for a 
quarter in which all four indicators are available, a recession occurs 
when two of the four variables signal recession. Table 1 summarizes re-
cessions in the 32 countries, with more detailed information provided 
in Table A2 in Appendix I. The average economy spends 20 percent of 
its time in a recession. A typical recession lasts slightly longer than a 
year while expansions last about four and a half years. Surprisingly, of 
the 32 countries, Switzerland has been in recession most often—nearly 
40 percent of the time—including much of the 1990s. In contrast and 
reflecting its fast growth throughout this period, South Korea has ex-
perienced three recessions, the fewest of the 32 countries. Moreover, 
two of South Korea’s recessions are associated with international events, 
with one coinciding with the Asian financial crisis of the 1990s and the 
other with the most recent global recession.
Calculating a global recession index
Each country in the sample experienced a recession beginning in 
either 2007 or 2008 (Table A2). Moreover, many of the European 
countries have experienced double-dip recessions since 2008. In any 
case, the uniformity of experience across countries since 2007 is strik-
ing. With the 32 business cycle chronologies in hand, an interesting 
extension is to calculate a recession index for the global economy. To 
do so, the wiring ratio is applied again, but now to the chronologies 
for the 32 countries in the sample. The wiring ratio calculated across 
the 496 country-pairs in the sample is plotted in Chart 2 and labeled 
the Global Recession Index. To ensure that the index is a global measure, 
each country is weighted by its Purchasing Power Parity-adjusted real 
GDP so that large economies receive more weight when falling into 
recession than small economies. 
Chart 2 reveals several global recessions since 1960. As a frame of 
reference, if all of the countries were the same size, and if half of the 
countries are in a recession at the same time, then the index equals 
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0.25. The most recent recession stands out as a unique experience. All 
countries in the sample experienced a recession in 2007-09 so that the 
index equals 1.0, the only time this has occurred since 1960. However, 
other well-known global events are visible, which makes the most re-
cent recession that much more impressive. Most notably, the oil crisis 
of 1973—the second highest spike in Chart 2—produced a wide-rang-
ing recession. The global recession index spikes to nearly 0.50 in the 
first quarter of 1975 and 22 of the 32 countries were in a recession at 
that time. The double dip of the early 1980s for the United States and 
many European countries is also easily identified. There is a similar 
double-dip pattern at the start of the 1990s, reflecting recessions that 
followed several disparate sources of turmoil, such as the first Iraq War, 
banking crises in Scandinavia, and the reunification of Germany. Each 
event contributed separately but simultaneously to national recessions 
in many of the countries. A mild global recession follows the bursting 
of the 2001 technology bubble. One global event not shown in the 
index is the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s. The index does not 
reflect this event because there are few Asian countries in the sample. 
However, Table A2 shows that many of the countries involved in the 
Asian financial crisis—Japan, South Korea, Russia, Argentina, and Bra-
zil—experienced recessions during this period.
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GLOBAL RECESSION INDEX: WIRING RATIO FOR 32 
ADVANCED ECONOMIES
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The synchronicity of global business cycles 
The next step in determining what affects the synchronicity of 
business cycles is to construct a measure of business cycle synchronic-
ity. Here, the degree of synchronicity between two countries over a 
time period is measured by the fraction of time that both countries 
are in the same state of the business cycle; that is, the fraction of time 
the countries are both in recession or are both in expansion (Hard-
ing and Pagan 2002). Recall that the previous subsection found that 
economies tend to be in recession about 20 percent of the time. There-
fore, statistically, if the occurrence of recession/expansion were com-
pletely independent across two countries, the countries would be in the 
same phase of the business cycle 68 percent of the time.3 Sixty-eight 
percent thus serves as the critical value for the measure of synchroniza-
tion. For example, consider the United States and the United Kingdom 
in the 1970s. They were in recession at the same time for four quarters, 
and they were in expansion together for 24 quarters. As a result, the 
U.S./U.K. pair in the 1970s was in the same phase of the business cycle 
70 percent of the time (28 quarters/40 quarters)—very close to the 
critical value of 68 percent. By this measure, U.S. and U.K. business 
cycles were largely independent of each other during this period. 
Of course, the fraction of time spent in the same business cycle can 
be calculated for all countries in the sample and for all the decades in the 
sample. Chart 3 provides one way of summarizing this information in 
one picture. The chart presents this same measure but calculates it across 
all 496 country-pairs in the sample separately for each decade. To con-
struct the chart, the fraction of time that two countries are in the same 
phase of the business cycle is calculated for each decade, giving 496 data 
points for each decade. To summarize these data, a smoothed version of 
a histogram, called a density, is calculated. Chart 3 presents the density 
for each of the decades in the sample. Because the densities for the first 
three decades of the sample—the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s—lie almost 
completely on top of one another, Chart 3 pools these 30 years together 
and shows only one density for the entire period. 
The density is read in the same way as a histogram. Higher values 
of the density indicate that a larger proportion of the 496 observations 
for that decade correspond to the value on the horizontal axis.4 In this 
way, Chart 3 shows business cycles have become more synchronized 
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in recent decades. For example, the peak of the density for the 1960s-
1980s is close to the critical value of 68 percent, which indicates that 
the synchronization during this period is close to what one would ex-
pect if business cycles were completely independent. The density is also 
quite wide, indicating that different country-pairs were in the same 
phase of the business cycle for different fractions of time. Business cy-
cles in the 1990s exhibit more synchronization, indicated by the shift 
in the density to the right. The density for the 2000s is even further to 
the right. The movements in the densities are not due to chance—each 
shift is meaningful in a statistical sense.5 The appearance of the shift in 
the 1990s hints at a fundamental change in the global economy—over 
the past 20 years, the business cycles of different countries have become 
more synchronized. 
II.  THE EFFECT OF GLOBALIZATION ON  
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS CYCLES
The previous section showed that business cycles have become 
more synchronized over the previous two decades. This section relates 
increased synchronicity to greater trade and financial linkages. Because 
economic theory does not clearly answer whether globalization will 
produce more highly synchronized business cycles, the issue is exam-
ined empirically. Specifically, after documenting the increase in global-
ization of trade in goods and services and the increase in international 
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DENSITY OF BUSINESS CYCLE SYNCHRONIZATION 
FOR THREE SAMPLE PERIODS
Source: Author calculations.
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holdings of financial instruments, the article discusses what economic 
theory and empirical evidence says about the effect of trade and finan-
cial linkages on business cycle synchronicity.
Globalization of international trade
International trade has grown dramatically over the last several de-
cades. The annual growth of the real dollar value of the imports and 
exports of the countries in the dataset has averaged about 10 percent 
since 1970. Because real GDP in these countries grew by less than 10 
percent annually, international trade as a share of output is now larger 
than it was 40 years ago. The situation in the United States illustrates 
this point (Chart 4). The chart plots real imports as a percentage of real 
GDP and real exports as a percentage of real GDP. In 1970, imports 
and exports were both about 5 percent of GDP. Since 1970, imports 
and exports have grown faster than GDP so that imports are now near-
ly 20 percent of GDP and exports are about 14 percent of GDP. The 
effect of the recent recession on international trade is also clear in the 
chart: imports and exports as a share of GDP both fell dramatically 
between 2007 and 2009.
International trade in all 32 countries shows a similar increase 
(Chart 5). To combine data from all 32 countries, the chart plots an 
unweighted average of imports-to-GDP and exports-to-GDP. As in the 
United States, imports and exports as a share of GDP have increased 
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U.S. IMPORTS AND EXPORTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP
Notes: Gray bars indicate recessions as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and National Bureau of Economic Research.
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for the countries as a whole. Since 1970, exports as a share of GDP 
have doubled while imports as a share of GDP have increased by about 
50 percent. Importantly for the discussion of business cycle synchron-
icity, there has been a dramatic increase in trade during the 1990s. 
Globalization of international finance
Although trade in goods and services has become a larger share 
of global output, the growth in the cross-border holdings of financial 
assets dwarfs this increase in trade. The dataset compiled by Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2007) shows the degree to which countries have be-
come financially linked by providing values for the external assets and 
liabilities of a large number of countries. Each country’s external assets 
and liabilities are further broken down by asset type: equity, debt and 
foreign direct investment (FDI). While the data only provide aggregate 
stocks of international holdings of financial assets, the analysis uses the 
data to construct proxies for bilateral asset holdings (see Appendix II 
for more details).
The growing importance of foreign assets held by U.S. residents 
and foreign liabilities owed by U.S. residents is shown in Chart 6. The 
United States has run a trade deficit for most of the past 40 years. The 
flip side of this trade deficit is the purchase of U.S. assets by foreign-
ers. To measure the increased globalization of international financial 
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GLOBAL IMPORTS AND EXPORTS AS A SHARE OF GDP: 
1970-2007
Notes: The chart plots an unweighted average of the ratios imports-to-GDP and exports-to-GDP. 
Source: Barbieri and Keshk (2012).
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Chart 6
INTERNATIONAL ASSETS AND LIABILITIES OF THE 
UNITED STATES
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markets for the United States, the upper panel of Chart 6 shows the 
sum of foreign assets and foreign liabilities as a share of GDP. This 
ratio has grown seven-fold over the last 40 years. The lower panel of 
Chart 6 shows the stock of U.S. assets (upper half of the chart) and li-
abilities (lower half of the chart) by asset type, this time in total dollar 
value to highlight the absolute value of the assets and liabilities of the 
U.S. economy. The growth in the stock of foreign assets and liabilities 
is broad-based, with assets and liabilities of all asset types growing over 
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the previous 20 years in particular. The well-known asymmetry in U.S. 
foreign asset holdings is visible: U.S. foreign assets tend to be equity or 
FDI, whereas the bulk of U.S. liabilities are debt instruments.
Chart 7 illustrates the increase in globalization of international 
finance markets for all the countries in the Lane and Milesi-Fertetti 
dataset. The chart shows the global sum of the dollar value of foreign 
assets and foreign liabilities as a ratio to the dollar value of global GDP. 
Similar to the United States, total world foreign assets and liabilities 
have grown from about 50 percent of global GDP in 1970 to more than 
300 percent of global output today. 
Chart 8 displays the total value of foreign assets and liabilities for a 
group of countries—Australia, Canada, Japan and Norway—again pre-
sented as a ratio to that country’s GDP. The increase in the international 
financial linkages is broad-based for each country. All four have a for-
eign assets and liabilities to GDP ratio of at least 200 percent. Norway 
in particular has used the income from its oil wealth to purchase large 
quantities of foreign assets—its foreign assets and liabilities to GDP ra-
tio is more than 500 percent. The right panel of Chart 8 shows the dol-
lar value of each country’s international asset position. Note that scales 
of the four countries are the same so they are comparable, although the 
scales are different from those in Chart 6 for the United States. The 
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FOREIGN ASSETS AND LIABILITIES AS A SHARE OF GDP
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Chart 8a
AUSTRALIA: FOREIGN ASSETS AND LIABILITIES 
AS A SHARE OF GDP
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Notes: The upper panel shows the ratio of the sum of foreign assets and liabilities to GDP. The lower panel shows the 
dollar value of foreign assets and liabilities, broken into asset type.
Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
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Chart 8b
CANADA: FOREIGN ASSETS AND LIABILITIES 
AS A SHARE OF GDP
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Notes: The upper panel shows the ratio of the sum of foreign assets and liabilities to GDP. The lower panel shows the 
dollar value of foreign assets and liabilities, broken into asset type.
Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
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Notes: The upper panel shows the ratio of the sum of foreign assets and liabilities to GDP. The lower panel shows the 
dollar value of foreign assets and liabilities, broken into asset type.
Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
 
Chart 8c
JAPAN: FOREIGN ASSETS AND LIABILITIES 
AS A SHARE OF GDP
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Chart 8d
NORWAY: FOREIGN ASSETS AND LIABILITIES 
AS A SHARE OF GDP
ÓÓ FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
composition of these foreign asset holdings varies dramatically across 
countries. For example, the net foreign asset position of Australia and 
Canada is in some ways similar to the United States: liabilities are pri-
marily dominated in debt while foreign assets are more likely to be equi-
ty or FDI. Japan is very different: its foreign liabilities are largely equity 
and debt instruments, while the country’s assets are dominated by debt.
After having documented the increase in globalization, this section 
now turns to the effect of globalization on business cycle synchronic-
ity—first theoretically and then empirically.
The effect of globalization on international business cycles: theory
Economic theory is unclear about the effect of increased trade and 
financial integration on business cycle synchronization. While both 
trade and financial linkages provide a channel through which demand 
shocks can be transmitted across economies—possibly leading to great-
er business cycle synchronicity—both types of connections can also 
produce offsetting effects that reduce business cycle synchronicity. In 
theory, it is difficult to tell which effects will dominate. 
Trade linkages provide a direct channel through which increased 
demand in one country is transmitted to increased production in an-
other country. For example, suppose that there are only two countries 
in the world, country A and country B. Consumers in both countries 
consume a basket of goods that consists of products produced in both 
countries. Imagine what happens if the demand for final goods by con-
sumers in country A increases. This demand shock raises the demand 
for all goods, including imports from country B. Country B will react 
by producing more goods to meet the extra demand from country A. 
Trade has transmitted this demand shock from A to B, leading to more 
synchronous business cycles because both countries produce both goods 
in response to the increased demand. 
Another way that trade may lead to synchronous business cycles 
is through intra-industry trade. Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001) have 
documented the growing importance of intra-industry trade to the 
global economy. When one country imports intermediate goods—that 
is, goods that will be used to produce some other good—industry-
specific shocks can be transmitted internationally. Continuing the ex-
ample, suppose country A produces intermediate goods—wheat and 
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steel—while country B produces final goods, bread and cars. In order to 
produce bread and cars, country B imports wheat and steel from coun-
try A. If country A experiences a drought such that wheat production 
(and therefore wheat exports) declines, then country B will produce less 
bread. As a result, the drought in country A affects output in country 
B in the same direction so business cycles will be more synchronized.
However, it is also possible that trade linkages could actually de-
crease the synchronization of business cycles between countries. Con-
sider the case where two countries specialize and trade different types 
of products. Instead of the example above, suppose that country A pro-
duces cars while country B produces and exports wheat. Again, sup-
pose that a drought significantly reduces country B’s wheat production. 
Clearly both countries will consume less bread, but country A’s car pro-
duction will remain relatively unharmed by the drought. Thus, even 
though both countries are adversely affected by the drought, it is clear 
that country A is less affected than country B. In this way, if countries 
specialize and trade very different types of goods, and if industry-specif-
ic shocks are important, then trade may actually reduce the synchronic-
ity of business cycle movements. 
The impact of financial linkages on business cycle synchronization 
is also ambiguous in theory. On the one hand, standard international 
business cycle theory (Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland 1992) would pre-
dict that the free-flow of capital internationally would decrease business 
cycle synchronization. To understand the mechanism, suppose that one 
country experiences a positive shock to its productivity while the other 
does not. Global investors will move their investments away from the 
relatively less productive economy to the more productive economy. 
As a result, the country with the positive productivity shock sees an 
increase in output for two reasons: directly from the positive produc-
tivity shock and indirectly from the inflow of funds from the foreign 
country. Unfortunately, the country without the productivity shock 
sees a decline in output because funds flow out of the country and into 
the now more productive country. Thus financial linkages can lead to 
asynchronous business cycles. To further complicate matters, Heathcote 
and Perri (2004) point out that it is difficult to determine if financial 
linkages cause asynchronous business cycle fluctuations, or if the reverse 
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is true, since asynchronous business cycle fluctuations also provide in-
vestors with good hedging opportunities.
Access to international financial markets means that investors can 
hold the assets of many different countries. Such diversification implies 
that shocks to the financial system of one country can affect the wealth 
of consumers in other countries, which in turn can affect consumption 
in that country. If consumers in one country hold a large portion of 
their equity assets in a foreign country, and the country’s stock market 
falls, then consumption in both countries will fall because consumers 
of both countries will be less wealthy. In a similar way, suppose that 
the value of an international bank’s assets in one country declines. In 
response, the bank may withdraw funds from many different countries 
simultaneously, leading to more highly correlated business cycles (see, 
e.g., Krugman 2008; Kollmann, Enders, and Muller 2011). Finally, as 
the European sovereign debt crisis has shown, financial market conta-
gion can reduce growth internationally.
The effect of globalization on international business cycles: empirical evidence
Theory is mixed on whether trade and financial linkages lead to 
more or less synchronous business cycles. Therefore, this section ex-
amines the issue empirically using the measure of synchronization 
observed across country-pairs produced earlier. Many empirical stud-
ies have attempted to sort the contradictory predictions of economic 
theory.6 Prior studies generally measure business cycle synchronicity 
by calculating the statistical correlation between the detrended output 
of economies. In contrast, this article focuses on the business cycle by 
looking at whether countries tend to experience expansions or reces-
sions at the same time. 
The regression analysis used in this analysis examines whether 
countries with close trade and financial relationships have business 
cycles that move together. Specifically, let Synchronizationijt denote the 
fraction of time country i and country j are in the same state of the 
business cycle during decade t. This measure is plotted for all country-
pairs in Chart 3. Further, let Trade linkagesijt measure the degree of trade 
linkages between the two countries and Financial linkagesijt measure the 
degree of financial linkages between the two countries, both measured 
at the start of decade t. Then the empirical effect of trade and financial 
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linkages on business cycle synchronization can be estimated using the 
following regression: 
Synchronizationijt = Gä + G£Êw Trade Linkagesijt + GÓÊÊw Financial linkagesijt   
(1)
+ ,wControls
The control variables take into account other characteristics that 
may be important for business cycle synchronization. The effect of 
trade and financial linkages on the synchronicity of business cycles is 
captured by the parameters G£Êand GÓÊ. 
The composition of countries’ international assets and liabilities 
can vary dramatically, and different asset types may transmit shocks 
internationally in different ways. For this reason, an expanded regres-
sion is also estimated:
Synchronizationijt = Gä + G£ w Trade Linkagesijt + GÓÊÊw Equity linkagesijt 
(2)
+ GÎwDebt Linkagesijt+ G{ÊwFDI linkagesijt + ,wControls
A finding that the parameters G1 to G4 are positive and statistically 
significant would mean that trade and financial linkages are important 
determinants of business cycle synchronicity. And because the previous 
section showed that trade and financial linkages have increased, this 
finding would explain in part why business cycles have become more 
synchronized in the last two decades. 
Two different definitions of the variable trade linkages are used in 
estimating equations (1) and (2). While both definitions measure the 
volume of bilateral trade between the two countries, one definition 
looks at bilateral trade relative to the total volume of trade between 
the two countries and all other countries; the other definition looks at 
bilateral trade relative to total GDP for the two countries. 
In addition, the statistical procedure used in estimating equations 
(1) and (2) must account for the fact that the key variables in the equa-
tions are simultaneously determined. The box “Dealing with Simul-
taneity between Business Cycle Synchronicity, Trade Linkages, and 
Financial Linkages” describes two ways for dealing with this problem. 
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Finally, two different sets of control variables are used when esti-
mating the equations. Although the control variables are not directly 
of interest, estimating different specifications are one way to test the 
robustness of the results. Appendix II discusses in detail the construc-
tion of the variables trade linkages and financial linkages as well as the 
different regression specifications.
The primary finding of the analysis is that a greater level of bilat-
eral trade between two countries is associated with those two countries 
having more highly synchronized business cycles (Table 2). The results 
indicate that spillover effects are important—demand shocks that are 
transmitted through trade linkages are more important than any offset-
ting effects due to specialization. The result is consistent with the previ-
ous literature and is robust. Of the eight regression specifications, five 
are positive and statistically significant, two are positive but statistically 
insignificant and one is negative and statistically insignificant. 
In economic terms, the magnitude of the effect is modest. The 
coefficient on trade linkages hovers around 0.02. Because the trade-
to-total trade and trade-to-GDP variables in the regression have been 
transformed by the log function (see Appendix II), this value means 
that a 10 percent increase in the trade intensity between two countries 
will increase the fraction of quarters that the countries spend in the 
same phase of the business cycle by 0.2. For example, consider that 
the trade-to-GDP ratio for U.S.-Mexico trade doubled between 1990 
and 2000. According to the estimate above, synchronization can be 
expected to increase by 2.0. Because there are 40 quarters in a decade, 
this means that during the 2000s, Mexico and the United States spent 
one additional quarter in the same phase of the business cycle than they 
otherwise would have had their trade-to-GDP ratio not changed. 
Financial connections as measured here do not appear to have an 
analogous impact on business cycle synchronization. Total financial 
linkages have a negative and often significant, effect on synchroniza-
tion. While a negative result is not inconsistent with economic the-
ory, it is somewhat surprising because the majority of empirical work 
has found a positive effect. Moreover, when financial connections are 
measured by asset type instead, the results are not consistent enough 
to draw strong conclusions about the impact that these connections 
have on business cycle synchronization. Countries with equity linkages 
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DEALING WITH SIMULTANEITY IN BUSINESS 
CYCLE SYNCHRONICITY, TRADE LINKAGES 
AND FINANCIAL LINKAGES 
The key variables in the two regression equations are deter-
mined simultaneously and are therefore said to be endogenous. 
While the regression equations are written so that it looks as 
though trade and financial linkages cause business cycle synchroni-
zation, it could be the other way around: a high degree of trade or 
financial linkages could be caused by business cycles that are highly 
synchronized. Moreover, rather than trade and financial linkages 
causing business cycle synchronicity, or business cycle synchronic-
ity causing trade and financial linkages, it could be that some other 
factor—for example, increased cooperation between policymakers 
around the world—is causing both greater trade and financial link-
ages and greater business cycle synchronicity. 
One way to reduce the simultaneity problem is to estimate 
the two regression equations using instrumental variables rather 
than ordinary least squares. An instrument is a variable that is 
correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable (trade and 
financial connectedness in this application) but is not correlated 
with the outcome (business cycle synchronization). Because the 
instrument is not correlated with the outcome, it can be used to 
“sterilize” the endogenous variable and produce proper estimates 
of the coefficients of interest. If the instruments are valid, then 
the regression results can be interpreted as causal relationships 
and not simply correlations. In the present application, variables 
from the so-called gravity model of international trade are used 
to instrument trade and financial linkages.7 These variables are 
essentially descriptions of a country’s specific characteristics, such 
as language, legal system and the distance from its trading part-
ners. A country’s specific characteristics are not correlated with 
its’ comovement with other economies around the world. More-
over, standard tests indicate that these instruments are strongly 
correlated with the endogenous regressors. The instruments are 
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therefore valid: they are exogenous to business cycle synchroniza-
tion yet correlated to the endogenous regressors.
Another way to further reduce the problem of endogeneity is to 
calculate the measures of trade and financial interconnectedness at 
the first quarter of each decade from 1970 to 2000 (see Appendix 
II). In this way, the trade and financial linkages for each country-
pair at the start of the decade are used to explain that country-pair’s 
degree of business cycle synchronization during that same decade, 
thereby reducing the likelihood that business cycle synchronization 
during the decade and linkages at the start of the decade are simul-
taneously determined. 
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appear to have more highly synchronized business cycles, although 
again the economic magnitude of the coefficient is relatively small. 
Debt and, perhaps surprisingly, FDI linkages do not appear to have a 
robust impact on business cycle synchronization. 
III.  CONCLUSION
The degree to which business cycles are now internationally syn-
chronized has increased significantly over the past 20 years, due in part 
to closer economic ties between countries. Regression analysis that ex-
ploits the cross-country differences in the intensity in which countries 
trade goods and hold external financial assets reveals that economies 
that trade with each other have more synchronized business cycles. Per-
haps surprisingly, financial linkages are not associated with more syn-
chronized business cycles. However, the proxies for bilateral financial 
connections used in the analysis are aggregate in nature. A study with 
more detailed data on the nature of financial linkages may well lead 
to different conclusions. This is an interesting and important area for 
future work. 
Although this article doesn’t address the shocks that catalyzed the 
initial downturn in the U.S. and world economies, others have pointed 
to some combination of high oil prices, shocks to the financial system, 
constrained demand due to overleveraged households, and high levels 
of uncertainty (see Stock and Watson 2012, Davig and Haakio 2010, 
Mian and Sufi 2010 and Bloom 2009, among others). No matter the 
ultimate cause, the evolution of the global economy over the previ-
ous several decades—particularly the dramatic increase in the flow of 
international trade in goods—has helped to set the stage for the global 
transmission of these shocks. Given that globalization continues un-
abated, U.S. policymakers need to remain vigilant to events occurring 
outside the United States, especially in areas to which the United States 
has close economic ties. 
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Real GDP Industrial Production Unemployment Retail Trade
Argentina 1990Q1-2011Q3 1994Q1-2011Q4 2002Q4-2011Q2 --
Australia 1960Q1-2011Q4 1960Q1-2011Q4 1966Q3-2011Q4 1983Q3-2011Q4
Austria 1964Q1-2011Q3 1960Q1-2011Q4 1960Q1-2011Q4 1973Q1-2011Q3
Belgium 1980Q1-2011Q3 1960Q1-2011Q4 1970Q1-2011Q4 1969Q1-2011Q4
Brazil 1995Q1-2011Q3 1975Q1-2011Q4 1981Q1-2011Q4 2000Q1-2011Q3
Canada 1960Q1-2011Q3 1960Q1-2011Q4 1960Q1-2011Q4 1970Q1-2011Q4
Chile 1980Q1-2011Q3 1960Q1-2011Q4 1986Q1-2011Q4 2005Q1-2011Q4
Czech Republic 1994Q1-2011Q3 1990Q1-2011Q4 1990Q1-2011Q4 1996Q1-2011Q4
Denmark 1977Q1-2011Q3 1960Q1-2011Q4 1970Q1-2011Q4 1968Q1-2011Q4
Finland 1970Q1-2011Q3 1960Q1-2011Q4 1960Q1-2011Q4 1960Q1-2011Q4
France 1960Q1-2011Q4 1960Q1-2011Q4 1967Q4-2011Q4 1975Q1-2011Q4
Germany 1960Q1-2011Q3 1960Q1-2011Q4 1962Q1-2011Q3 1960Q1-2011Q4
Great Britain 1960Q1-2011Q3 1960Q1-2011Q4 1971Q1-2011Q3 1960Q1-2011Q4
Greece 1977Q1-2011Q1 1962Q1-2011Q4 1998Q2-2011Q3 1963Q1-2010Q4
Iceland 1997Q1-2011Q4 1998Q1-2011Q3 1980Q1-2011Q4 1990Q1-2011Q3
Ireland 1997Q1-2011Q4 1960Q1-2011Q3 1982Q1-2011Q4 1968Q1-2011Q4
Israel 1968Q1-2011Q4 1960Q1-2011Q4 1992Q1-2011Q3 1995Q1-2011Q4
Italy 1980Q1-2011Q3 1960Q1-2011Q4 1960Q1-2011Q3 1990Q1-2011Q4
Japan 1960Q1-2011Q3 1960Q1-2011Q4 1960Q1-2011Q4 1970Q1-2011Q2
Mexico 1980Q1-2011Q3 1960Q1-2011Q4 1987Q1-2011Q4 1986Q1-2011Q4
Netherlands 1977Q1-2011Q3 1960Q1-2011Q4 1970Q1-2011Q4 1960Q2-2011Q4
New Zealand 1982Q2-2011Q3 1977Q2-2011Q3 1986Q1-2011Q4 1963Q1-2011Q4
Norway 1966Q1-2011Q4 1960Q1-2011Q4 1972Q1-2011Q3 1960Q1-2011Q4
Portugal 1977Q1-2011Q3 1960Q1-2011Q4 1983Q1-2011Q4 1990Q1-2011Q4
Russia 1995Q1-2011Q3 1993Q1-2011Q4 1992Q4-2011Q4 1995Q1-2011Q4
S. Korea 1960Q1-2011Q3 1960Q1-2011Q4 1989Q1-2011Q4 1990Q1-2011Q4
South Africa 1960Q1-2011Q3 1963Q1-2011Q4 2000Q1-2011Q3 1977Q1-2011Q4
Spain 1970Q1-2011Q3 1961Q1-2011Q4 1972Q4-2011Q4 1995Q1-2011Q3
Sweden 1969Q1-2011Q3 1960Q1-2011Q4 1970Q1-2011Q4 1960Q1-2011Q4
Switzerland 1965Q1-2011Q3 1960Q1-2011Q4 1970Q1-2011Q4 2002Q1-2011Q3
Turkey 1987Q1-2011Q3 1989Q1-2011Q3 2000Q1-2011Q4 --
United States 1960Q1-2011Q4 1960Q1-2011Q4 1960Q1-2011Q4 1960Q1-2011Q4
APPENDIX I
/>LiÊ£
DATES FOR WHICH BUSINESS CYCLE DATA IS AVAILABLE
Sources: Data on real GDP, industrial production indices and unemployment rates all from the International Mon-
etary Fund’s International Financial Statistics database. Retail sales index from OECD.
ÎÓ FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
/>LiÊÓ
COUNTRY-SPECIFIC BUSINESS CYCLE CHRONOLOGIES*
Argentina Australia Austria Belgium
1989q4-2011q4 1960q1-2011q4 1960q1-2011q4 1960q1-2011q4
Peak Trough Peak Trough Peak Trough Peak Trough
1994q3 1995q3 1960q3 1961q2 1961q3 1963q1 1960q1 1961q1
1998q2 1999q2 1965q3 1966q1 1964q4 1965q2 1965q4 1966q2
1999q4 2000q3 1971q3 1972q1 1966q1 1967q3 1974q2 1975q2
2001q1 2002q1 1974q2 1975q4 1974q3 1975q2 1977q1 1978q1
2008q3 2009q2 1976q2 1976q4 1977q4 1978q2 1980q1 1980q4
1977q2 1978q1 1980q4 1981q2 1982q1 1983q2
1980q1 1980q2 1982q1 1982q3 1992q1 1993q4
1981q2 1983q2 1983q4 1984q2 2001q1 2001q4
1990q4 1991q2 1986q2 1986q4 2003q1 2003q3
1996q1 1996q4 1992q2 1993q2 2008q2 2009q1
2008q2 2008q3 2001q1 2001q3
2003q1 2003q3
2008q2 2009q2
Brazil Canada Chile Czech Republic
1975q1-2011q4 1960q1-2011q4 1960q1-2011q4 1990q1-2011q4
Peak Trough Peak Trough Peak Trough Peak Trough
1980q3 1980q4 1979q3 1980q2 1960q1 1960q3 1990q4 1992q1
1982q4 1983q1 1981q2 1982q4 1966q3 1969q1 1992q3 1993q1
1987q1 1987q3 1989q3 1991q1 1970q2 1970q4 1996q4 1998q4
1988q2 1988q4 2008q3 2009q2 1971q4 1973q2 2003q3 2004q1
1989q4 1990q2 1974q1 1975q3 2008q3 2009q2
1991q3 1992q3 1981q1 1982q4
1995q1 1995q3 1984q2 1985q1
1997q3 1999q1 1990q1 1991q1
2001q1 2001q3 1998q1 1999q1
2003q1 2003q2 2000q1 2000q3
2008q3 2009q1 2002q4 2003q3
2008q2 2009q3
*As determined by the Bry-Boschan algorithm and the procedure described in Section I. 
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Denmark Finland France Greece
1960q1-2011q4 1960q1-2011q4 1960q1-2011q4 1962q1-2011q4
Peak Trough Peak Trough Peak Trough Peak Trough
1962q3 1963q1 1966q4 1967q2 1966q3 1968q2 1973q3 1974q3
1970q4 1971q2 1967q4 1968q2 1969q4 1972q3 1980q1 1980q4
1973q3 1975q1 1975q1 1975q4 1974q2 1975q2 1981q3 1983q1
1976q2 1976q3 1976q2 1977q3 1977q1 1977q3 1984q3 1985q1
1977q3 1977q4 1981q3 1981q4 1979q3 1980q4 1985q4 1987q2
1979q4 1981q1 1990q1 1993q3 1991q4 1993q1 1989q4 1990q3
1986q3 1987q1 2008q1 2009q3 1995q3 1996q3 1991q3 1993q1
1987q4 1989q3 2008q1 2009q1 2008q2 2011q4
1992q1 1993q2
1995q1 1995q3
2008q2 2009q4
2011q2 2011q4
Germany Great Britain Iceland Ireland
1960q1-2011q4 1960q1-2011q4 1980q1-2011q4 1960q1-2011q4
Peak Trough Peak Trough Peak Trough Peak Trough
1960q4 1961q2 1965q1 1966q4 1981q3 1984q1 1965q1 1966q2
1966q3 1967q2 1969q2 1969q4 1987q3 1989q4 1974q1 1975q1
1973q4 1975q2 1973q4 1975q3 2000q3 2001q1 1980q1 1980q3
1980q1 1982q3 1977q1 1977q2 2001q4 2003q1 1981q3 1982q1
1986q4 1987q1 1979q2 1981q1 2007q4 2010q1 1987q4 1988q1
1991q1 1993q2 1990q2 1991q3 1990q3 1991q2
1995q2 1996q1 2008q1 2009q2 1992q3 1993q1
2001q1 2002q1 2002q2 2002q4
2002q3 2003q2 2007q3 2009q4
2008q3 2009q2
/>LiÊÓÊVÌÕi`
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Israel Italy Japan Mexico
1960q1-2011q4 1960q1-2011q4 1960q1-2011q4 1960q1-2011q4
Peak Trough Peak Trough Peak Trough Peak Trough
1966q1 1967q2 1964q1 1964q3 1962q3 1962q4 1962q1 1962q3
1976q2 1977q4 1974q2 1975q3 1964q4 1965q2 1969q2 1969q3
1988q2 1989q2 1976q4 1977q3 1973q4 1975q1 1970q2 1970q4
2001q2 2001q4 1978q4 1979q2 1985q4 1986q2 1981q4 1983q3
2002q2 2003q1 1981q1 1983q2 1992q1 1993q3 1985q3 1986q4
2008q2 2009q1 1984q3 1985q1 1997q1 1999q1 1992q4 1993q3
1992q1 1993q3 2001q1 2001q4 1994q3 1995q3
1996q3 1996q4 2008q1 2009q1 2000q3 2001q4
2001q1 2001q3 2010q3 2011q2 2006q2 2006q3
2002q3 2003q2 2008q2 2009q2
2007q3 2009q2
Netherlands New Zealand Norway Portugal
1960q1-2011q4 1963q1-2011q4 1960q1-2011q4 1960q1-2011q4
Peak Trough Peak Trough Peak Trough Peak Trough
1960q1 1966q3 1967q3 1960q1 1967q4 1966q2 1967q1
1980q1 1982q4 1970q2 1971q4 1980q2 1980q3 1970q2 1971q1
1992q1 1993q2 1974q3 1975q1 1981q4 1982q3 1974q1 1975q3
2001q3 2002q1 1975q4 1976q3 1988q1 1988q4 1983q1 1983q3
2003q1 2003q2 1982q2 1983q1 2003q1 2003q3 1992q2 1994q1
2008q2 2009q2 1984q4 1986q1 2008q2 2009q2 2002q3 2003q1
2011q2 2011q4 1986q3 1988q2 2009q4 2010q2 2008q1 2009q2
1989q2 1990q2 2011q1 2011q4
1990q4 1991q3
1992q2 1992q3
1997q2 1998q2
2007q4 2009q1
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Russia South Africa South Korea Spain
1992q4-2011q4 1960q1-2011q4 1960q1-2011q4 1961q1-2011q4
Peak Trough Peak Trough Peak Trough Peak Trough
1997q4 1998q3 1976q3 1977q3 1980q1 1980q2 1974q4 1975q2
2008q3 2009q2 1981q4 1983q1 1997q3 1998q2 1980q4 1981q2
1984q2 1986q1 2008q1 2009q1 1991q4 1993q2
1986q3 1986q4 2007q3 2009q4
1989q3 1989q4 2011q1 2011q4
1990q3 1993q2
1997q4 1999q2
2002q2 2002q4
2008q2 2009q2
Sweden Switzerland Turkey United States
1960q1-2011q4 1960q1-2011q4 1980q1-2011q4 1960q1-2011q4
Peak Trough Peak Trough Peak Trough Peak Trough
1966q1 1966q3 1960q1 1964q4 1988q1 1988q4 1966q4 1967q1
1976q3 1978q2 1967q2 1967q3 1993q4 1994q2 1969q3 1970q1
1980q1 1981q3 1974q2 1976q1 1998q3 1999q2 1973q4 1975q1
1982q1 1982q4 1978q2 1979q1 2000q3 2001q3 1980q1 1980q3
1990q4 1992q4 1981q1 1982q4 2004q4 2005q1 1981q3 1982q3
1995q3 1996q1 1986q3 1987q1 2008q1 2009q1 1990q2 1991q1
2008q1 2009q2 1990q1 1993q2 2011q2 2011q3 2000q4 2001q3
1996q2 1997q2 2007q4 2009q2
1998q1 1998q4
2001q1 2002q1
2008q2 2009q2
Source: Author calculations.
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APPENDIX II
Bilateral measures of trade intensity follow Frankel and Rose (1998) 
and Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005). Specifically, bilateral trade data is 
collected from the Correlates of War database.1 With the data, two dif-
ferent measures of trade intensity are produced for each country-pair. 
The first measures the intensity of bilateral trade of the two countries 
relative to the total amount that those two countries trade, while the 
second measures the intensity of bilateral trade for two countries rela-
tive to their national outputs. Specifically,
Trade/total tradeij = (EXij +  EXji )/(EXi + IMi +EXj + IMj)
Trade/GDPij = (EXij +  EXji )/(NGDPi + NGDPj )
Measuring financial connections bilaterally is more difficult. The 
data of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) do not contain bilateral hold-
ings of financial asset, only aggregate assets and liabilities by asset type 
for a large group of countries. However, proxies for bilateral holdings 
can be constructed by following Imbs (2004): 
BF
NFA
NGDP
NFA
NGDP
BF
NFA
NGDP
NFA
NGDP
BF
NFA
NGDP
NFA
NGDP
BF
NFA
NGDP
NFA
NGDP
ij
total i
total
i
j
total
j
ij
equity i
equity
i
j
equity
j
ij
debt i
debt
i
j
debt
j
ij
fdi i
fdi
i
j
fdi
j
"
"
"
"
_
_
_
_
All proxies for bilateral trade and financial holdings are expressed in 
logs within the regressions.
Two different sets of fixed-effects are used. One set of fixed effects 
control for decade-specific effects that may not be captured by the grav-
ity equation instruments. The other set of fixed effects control for both 
period-specific and country-pair-specific effects not captured by the 
gravity equation instruments. 
1See:ÊÌÌ«\ÉÉVÀÀi>ÌiÃÊvÜ>À°À}É
"7Ó¯Óä>Ì>É/À>`iÉ/À>`i°Ì.
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ENDNOTES
1See the spreadsheet found at http://nber.org/cycles/recessions.html.
2For example, with four variables there are six different pairs: GDP-employ-
ment, GDP-industrial production, GDP-retail sales, employment-industrial pro-
duction, employment-retail sales and industrial production-retail sales. Suppose 
that GDP, employment and industrial production all indicate recession, whereas 
retail sales do not. Among all six pairs, three have both variables indicating a re-
cession so that the wiring ratio equals 0.50. In general, if nt denotes the number 
of available indicators at date t, and kt denotes the number of indicators that 
signal recession at time t, then the wiring ratio is calculated as: w k k
n n
( 1)
( 1)t
t t
t t
=
−
−
.
3Assuming that the two events are independent means that the probability 
of both countries being in recession at any given point in time is 0.2 w 0.2 = 0.04 
and the probability of both being in an expansion is 0.8 w0.8 = 0.64. Then the 
probability of either both being in recession or both being in expansion is 0.64 + 
0.04 = 0.68, or 68 percent. 
4The values for the index are normalized so that the density is well defined, 
i.e., that it integrates to one. 
5A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic rejects the null hypothesis that the 
densities are the same at standard confidence intervals. 
6Frankel and Rose (1998) were the first to test for these effects. They found 
that trade tends to increase the synchronicity of business cycles. A relatively large 
empirical literature has confirmed these findings. Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005) 
consider a large number of potential explanations for bilateral business cycle cor-
relations and find that trade is the most robust explanatory variable. Rose and 
Engel (2002) study the impact of currency unions on synchronization. Imbs 
(2004, 2006) studies many links that may effect business cycle synchronization, 
including trade, specialization and financial integration. Finally, Claessens, Kose 
and Terrones (2011) study the interaction between financial cycles and business 
cycles. They find that recessions that correspond with financial downturns tend 
to be deeper and longer lasting than business cycle downturns that do not.
7The gravity model of international trade explains bilateral trade as a func-
tion of country characteristics. See Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). Feenstra 
and Taylor (2008) provide textbook discussions of the gravity model. The spe-
cific variables used as instruments include country size (log of the sum of the 
two countries’ GDP) and the distance between capital cities. In addition, several 
dummy variables are included: do the countries share a common border? Do 
they share a common language? Do they have a regional trade agreement? Is the 
country land-locked? Is the country an island?
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